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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Bulgarian political and economic issues regarding NATO’s 
military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. It studies: Bulgarian policy regarding 
Kosovo crisis; the domestic political attitudes and discussions over NATO’s military 
intervention and over government’s foreign policy on this issue; the impact of the war in 
Yugoslavia and post-war order on Bulgarian economy and Bulgarian domestic and 
foreign politics. The thesis attempts to evaluate some cost-effective assessments about 
short and long term consequences for Bulgaria. 
In spite of the initial highly negative and catastrophic expectations of the Bulgarian 
public, the country gained significant political dividends. Bulgarian prospects for EU and 
NATO membership now seem to be much more realistic than ever in the past. 
At the same time, NATO intervention and the postwar settlements have not 
solved the ethnic, political, military and economic problems on the Balkans, but 
complicated them and posed serious new risks for Bulgaria and for the Balkans in 
general. The war also brought certain negative ecologic effects. The intervention in 
Yugoslavia and its support by the Bulgarian government complicated Bulgarian-Russian 
relations, which most probably will have long-term negative effect on Bulgarian 
economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ethnic conflict in Kosovo emerged in the end of the 1980s and was gradually 
gaining speed by 1998, when with the appearance of the KLA it turned into an ethnic 
civil war. For the Serbian violent chauvinism it was simply a continuation of the bloody 
ethnic slaughters in Bosnia and of the ethnic clashes in Croatia and Slovenia. 
Surprisingly (not only for Milosevic and for the Serbs) after its long shameful indolence 
witnessing the extreme and disgusting mass atrocities in Bosnia, this time NATO took the 
initiative and acted (and overacted) decisively. Milosevic received an ultimatum. It’s 
clauses seemed so extreme that nobody seriously expected that Milosevic would accept 
it. The outcome was an unavoidable military intervention and war over Kosovo. The war 
lasted less than two and a half months, but it radically changed the situation and the fate 
of the Balkans, established precedents, gave nuances to and created new realities in 
Europe and in the world order. 
The Bulgarian government took an active position on the issue before the 
beginning of the intervention. In a dramatic and risky international and domestic 
situation the Bulgarian leaders took an important decision and decisively pursued it. The 
war and the policy of the government towards it seem to have significant and long-term 
consequences for the country. 
The purpose of the thesis is to study the Bulgarian political and economic issues 
related to NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia. The main issues and main 
questions of the research are as follows: 
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- What was the policy of the Bulgarian government towards the Kosovo crisis 
and NATO military intervention there? 
- What were the factors and motives influencing this policy, and how did it 
evolve? 
- What was the attitude of the Bulgarian public toward NATO military 
intervention in Yugoslavia? 
- What problems and frictions did, the Bulgarian government support for 
NATO policy towards Yugoslavia, face? 
- What were the expectations and the forecasts, of both the government and the 
public, for the consequences of the war for Bulgaria and how they conform to 
the real immediate and long-term economic, political and social outcome? 
- How did the Bulgarian policy regarding NATO intervention affect the 
international status quo of the country and its relations with NATO member 
countries as well as with Russia, and the neighboring Balkan countries? 
- Was the Bulgarian support for NATO intervention in Yugoslavia justified in 
terms of national interests? What are the gains, losses, and risks? 
- How would in the long-run the future of the Balkans and Bulgaria in 
particular be affected by the most recent war in Yugoslavia and the postwar 
settlement of the issue ? 
- How did NATO military intervention and the government support for it, 
influence the Bulgarian domestic politics. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate some cost-effective assessments about the 
short and long term consequences of the crisis for Bulgaria. Furthermore, it outlines the 
problems, misperceptions, ethnic, political, social and economic threats for Bulgaria, as 
well as for the EU and NATO policy in this region. 
This thesis represents the best comprehensive examination of the topic. The 
analysis relies on open sources: official documents of the Bulgarian government, 
statistical data, articles in the Bulgarian, European and United States press. As the main 
sources for this topic are Bulgarian, most of them are not widely accessible in the United 
States. 
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11. BULGARIA, NATO, AND IT’S CAMPAIGN IN KOSOVO: POLITICAL 
AND PUBLIC ISSUES 
On May 4th 1999 the Bulgarian parliament formally ratified an agreement 
providing its airspace to the use of NATO during hostilities with Yugoslavia. In the 
Bulgarian National Assembly 154 M p s  voted for while only 83 of them were against it. 
The result of the vote did not surprise anyone taking into account that the ruling Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) was consistently supporting NATO bombing campaign against 
Serbia as well as the overall majority of the party in Parliament. 
A. ATTITUDE OF THE BULGARIAN PUBLIC TOWARD NATO AND THE 
CONJXICT OVER KOSOVO 
Though party discipline and consolidated voting of the ruling majority may 
present a misleading picture of the Bulgarian attitude toward NATO campaign in 
Kosovo, attention should be paid to the fact that the public attitude in the country was 
rather controversial. In spite of the determined vote in Parliament, the decision itself was 
politically very complicated and dramatic. It was not easy to take such a decision. The 
resolute support of the Bulgarian government for NATO military campaign against 
Yugoslavia posed certain economic, military and political risks for Bulgaria and 
threatened the popularity of the ruling coalition. 
3 
1. Reasons and Factors, Shaping the Bulgarian Public Attitude Towards 
NATO Military Campaign in Yugoslavia 
While in neighboring Romania the opposition Socialist Party supports NATO 
membership it is not quite the case with Bulgaria. The general belief is that the public 
opinion is against NATO bombing campaign; more than that, people’s concerns became 
even stronger when on April 30th, a missile accidentally tore off the roof of a house in the 
outskirts of the capital Sofia. Since March 24th this was the sixth misguided bomb to land 
on Bulgarian territory. 
We can easily leave aside the variations in the political attitude towards NATO, 
since everybody is entitled to one of his own. The much more serious problem the 
Bulgarians had to face were the costs of the war: millions of dollars in lost trade because 
of closed traffic on the Danube and closed transit through Yugoslavia, which is the short 
cut to all Western markets. 
There is yet another important factor shaping the negative attitude toward NATO 
military campaign. It seems that not enough account was taken of it or at least it is not 
articulated clearly enough in the majority of the analysis done so far. Throughout the 20th 
century history of war Bulgaria had the live through three national catastrophes. In all 
these wars (the Balkan wars of 191 1-1913, the First World War, and the Second World 
War) Bulgaria played a central and highly active role of a revengeful and aggressive 
political and military force on the Balkans, seeking its national unification. A cornerstone 
issue of all these Balkan conflicts was Macedonia, where the overwhelming majority of 
the population had a Bulgarian self-determination, and where a century earlier the 
Bulgarian national revival was initiated. This recurring and painful historical experience 
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resulted in a peculiar Bulgarian pacifistic syndrome, unanalyzed by anybody by now. It 
is very similar to the German syndrome after the World War II. The Bulgarian public 
fears of any military conflict on the Balkans, and most of all it fears of any possibility for 
involving the country in such a conflict. Due to that the Bulgarian public is absolutely 
negative to any militarism and any military action on the Balkans, and rejects any 
political act of support for any kind of military conflict. 
For that same reason, the Bulgarians are fearful and suspicious of any precedent, 
related to violating the temtorial status quo and the sovereignty of the countries on the 
Balkan Peninsula in favor of ethnic principles, as they see in it the possibility for new 
Balkan wars. Unfortunately, the Kosovo case turned out to be exactly what the 
Bulgarians feared mostly. The fact that Bulgaria has Turkish and Muslim Bulgarians 
minorities (8-10% of the population, compactly settled mostly along the Bulgarian 
borders) is yet another reason for strong fears from such precedents. 
The war in Kosovo and its secession from Serbia indirectly touches upon one of 
the most sensitive aspects of the Bulgarian historical syndrome, Macedonia. The 
precedent with Kosovo poses serious threats to the neighboring Macedonia with its 
expansively growing minority of Albanians as represented by their aggressive nationalist 
party. As far as information goes the KLA and Albanian organizations in Macedonia are 
closely interacting. 
There is a paradoxical situation in the Bulgarian attitude and fears for Macedonia. 
On the one hand, nobody in the Bulgarian society has any doubts about the 
Bulgarian ethnicity of the Macedonians. All the Greek as well as the majority of sources 
of the other Balkan countries share he same opinion, excluding quite anurally the sources 
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in Macedonia, and partly those in Yugoslavia. During the last two centuries Macedonia 
gave birth to a significant part of the Bulgarian public elite: writers, artists, politicians, 
scholars, etc. The first ideas, events and figures of the Bulgarian national revival 
movement started in Macedonia and after that they spread in the other parts of the 
Bulgarian territories. According to the censuses in the beginning of the 20th century 
when Macedonia was part of the Ottoman Empire, between 50% and 80% of the 
population in the different Macedonian areas was Bulgarian. According to the last census 
done in independent and “free” Macedonia there are no Bulgarians at all. 
On the other hand, because of its frustrating historical experience with the 
Macedonian problem, the Bulgarian public generally has a highly negative attitude 
toward any possible Bulgarian commitment to this problem. That is why it fears any new 
upheaval in this country, which may involve Bulgaria in any political or military 
confrontation. In spite of the historical truth and the historical background of Macedonia 
and because of the series of Bulgarian war catastrophes, the majority of the Bulgarians 
accept the existence of an independent Macedonia separated from Bulgaria as something 
given and as part of the contemporary status quo, which has to be preserved in order to 
keep the peace on the Balkans. Therefore, there is no serious and influential politician in 
Bulgaria, who would dear to pursue the political rejoining of Macedonia. What, the 
overall Bulgarian public and politicians pursue, is an intensive cultural and economic 
exchange, as well as good neighborly relations in the field of politics. That is why, 
despite the humiliating anti-Bulgarian ideological campaign in the Republic of 
Macedonia, Bulgaria was the first country to recognize it as an independent state (not 
completely agreeing on the issues of the so-called “Macedonian” language and 
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Macedonian nation). Later on, seeking to maintain good neighborly relations, and to 
avoid any reason for conflicts, the Bulgarian government was forced to accept the twist 
of the history and to recognize formally the existence of a Macedonian nation and of a 
“Macedonian” language as the official language of the Republic of Macedonia. (The way 
this act was justified in front of the Bulgarian public was by explaining that it is only 
formal and indispensable recognition of the formal statement of the Macedonian 
Constitution, which defines the Macedonian dialect of the Bulgarian language as a 
Macedonian language. This act is dealing with a formal law, and has nothing to do with 
the language and historical truth.) Finally, Bulgaria was the country that donated 94 (!) 
tanks to Macedonia. By doing this Bulgaria contributed to the strengthening of the 
fragile defense capabilities of Macedonia, which in fact gives Bulgaria good reasons to 
avoid a direct (and dangerous) military commitment to the defense of Macedonia in case 
of probable military conflicts in the future. 
The Bulgarian public fears that the Kosovo precedent poses great risks for the 
Macedonian security, as well as for the Bulgarian security. Macedonia could very well 
be “the next in the Balkan domino.” Probable dramatic upheavals with the Albanians in 
that country may force the Macedonian decision-makers to recall their Bulgarian roots 
and to ask help from Bulgaria. Such a development may involve Bulgaria in a conflict, 
despite of the will of the Bulgarian public and politicians to stay away from any 
Macedonian problems. 
Other factors that shaped the Bulgarian public attitude toward the conflict over 
Kosovo were related to the Bulgarian cultural background. The interpretations of the 
conflict in terms of a “clash of civilizations” were popular among certain opposition 
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circles in the Bulgarian public. They were strongly influenced by Samuel Huntington’s 
approach, which seems to have a dangerous influence on international relations, and 
especially on inter-ethnic and international relations on the Balkans. The followers of this 
approach joined the arguments of the Serb’s propaganda and claimed that the conflict is 
between the Orthodox Slavic civilization and the Muslim one, supported by the West. In 
the light of such arguments Bulgaria as an Orthodox and Slavic nation, which has a heavy 
historical burden left by five centuries of Muslim rule, should not support NATO military 
intervention against Slavic and Orthodox Serbia. According to these interpretations, the 
Bulgarian support for NATO campaign would aggravate not only the relations with 
neighboring Yugoslavia, but also the relations with Russia, since NATO military 
intervention was seen as aiming to push out Russia from a considered of its vital interest 
area. Whereas NATO campaign was seen to affirm the United States world’s hegemony, 
avoiding the UN Security Council and the obstructions of the Russian. Since Bulgaria is 
greatly depending on Russian oil and energy this government policy was seen and 
considered to be against the Bulgarian interests. 
For sure the Bulgarian public opinion was shaped taking into account the 
elements of the cultural attitude. We had a similar situation in Orthodox Greece, a NATO 
member, where the public and even part of the government was against NATO military 
intervention. Anyway, the importance of these cultural factors was usually exaggerated 
and exploited by the Bulgarian opposition and by the media influenced by it. 
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2. Opinion Polls and Mass Media Coverage of the Conflict and the 
Government Support for NATO Campaign 
The opinion polls and the attitude of the mass media extremely well mirrored the 
public attitude during the dramatic situation in the spring of 1999. 
The key to understanding the situation in Bulgaria is the obvious fact that the 
majority of the Bulgarians were against NATO bombing. From the very start, public 
opinion polls showed that the opposition to the latter exceeded 65%. This high percentage 
of opponents was misinterpreted both by the politicians as well as the media, since 65% 
against NATO strikes does not mean 65% in support of the Serbian cause or Milosevic - 
contrary to what the opposition suggested and to the impression that the common readers 
were left with. It is a fact, however, that there was no open support for NATO in the 
media in the first few weeks of the war, partly because this would have meant "support 
for the war." The opponents of the war, however, proved to be of a complex composition, 
which explains the apparent contradictions in poll findings - though 65% of the 
Bulgarians were against the air strikes, almost the same percentage qualified the Cabinet's 
stand as adequate, and support for Bulgaria's membership in NATO, though slightly 
lower, remains at around 50%. 1 
The split of the Bulgarian public was reflected in the split of the media. On the 
one side, daily papers like Monitor, Sega (influenced by the left centrist Parliamentary 
coalition) and Douma (daily of the Bulgarian Socialist Party) were against the Allied 
military campaign and Bulgaria's support for it (or involvement in any form whatsoever). 
On the other side, daily papers like Standart News and Demokratsiya (daily of the ruling 
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coalition Union of the Democratic Forces) are for NATO strikes in general and the 
response of the Bulgarian Govemment in particular. The dailies with the highest 
circulation, Troud and 24 Chassa (owned by a German press group), seek a more 
balanced approach (especially in the first days of the conflict), in an effort to maintain 
plurality of opinion. 
As a whole, the tone of the press reaction is a sort of a crescendo. The dailies are 
almost hysterical in their coverage of events such as stray NATO missiles in Bulgaria or 
rumors that NATO aircrafts were flying over this country. Such events are invariably 
reported on the front page under banner headlines: "Missile Hits Trun" (Sega, Mar 27); 
"Second Missile Drops 8 Km fiom Trun" (Sega, Mar 3 1); "200 NATO Aircrafts Fly Over 
Bulgaria" (Douma, Apr 8), "Toxic Cocktail Spreads by Water and Air" (Sega, Apr 20); 
"Oil [Slick] fiom the War [Drifts] Near N-Plant" (24 Chassa, Apr 8); "They Treat Us 
with Depleted Uranium"( Douma, Apr 29).* 
In its first days and weeks, the war even overshadowed the domestic news. It was 
the sole topic in the international columns. There was virtually no independent coverage 
of the neighbors, who are mentioned only in connection with the military conflict. The 
press had lost the race with the electronic media. Since bombing was carried out mainly 
at night, the morning dailies (there is just one afternoon daily in Bulgaria) were full of 
"stale" news already reported on TV and radio. This is partly why the papers opted for the 
sensational approach - since the news can no longer be sold as news, the press stakes on 
Yanovski, Roumen, Balkan Neighbours Project. The War in Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian Press, 




sensational reporting (hair-raising banner headlines, suspicions and highlights). The 
incumbents also contribute to this with their inadequate information policy. 
As the crisis escalated, polarization of opinion on the adequacy of Sofia's 
response acquired hysterical proportions in the views and positions of the opposition 
press. Some of the evaluations were clearly provocative, which was one of the reasons for 
soaring public tensions and the hysterical reaction of the opposition. Thus, for instance, 
Monitor conveyed the impression of a chasm between the attitude of the public and the 
Government: "A Government Against a Nation" (Apr 2 1). The ruling majority was 
accused of being an instrument of interests running counter to national interests. Some 
described the incumbents as "Bulgarian puppets" whose strings are pulled by their 
"American masters"; "The Government serves NATO" (Douma, Mar 3 1). 
Criticism of the Government's information policy was strong (and justified): 
"...the incumbents' communiquCs and reports of the 'strike' resemble CNN newscasts (...) 
The political elite was sending confusing messages that abound in pretentious and absurd 
phrases incomprehensible to the ordinary public" (Sega, Apr 8). "It is better to have 
politicians with clear stands with whom one disagrees than to support secretive rulers" 
(Sega, Apr 20). 
The other side (Demokratsiya and Standart News) presented the stand and the 
reactions of the incumbents in a much better light - as efforts to reach the best decision 
for the Bulgarian national interests by conducting an active and responsible policy. 
Without laudatory evaluations (inappropriate in such situations), these dailies' support for 
the official stand consisted mainly of detailed coverage highlighting the positive aspects 
of this stand. Along with objective information on the concrete steps undertaken by the 
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Government, the dailies devoted considerable space to the power-holders' attitude to the 
activities of the opposition and mainly of the BSP. This shows that the authorities have 
been jumpy and have occasionally overreacted to criticism from the opposition. For 
example, one of the UDF leaders, Hristo Bisserov, described BSP leader Purvanov as "a 
threat to national security"; "The BSP is Milosevic's ... the BSP is a threat to the 
Government and unfortunately a threat to the State abroad, trying to incite anti-Bulgarian 
feelings in a neighboring country [Yugoslavia]" (interview in 24 Chassa, Mar 3 1). "The 
BSP is trying to drag us into war" (Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova in 
Demokratsiya, Mar 3 1). 
With the time, toward the end of the war, the dailies with the largest circulation 
Troud and 24 Chassa gradually evolved into a more balanced approach (but not a more 
moderate language), publishing the opinions of both sides, while the attitude of Monitor 
and Douma remained ~nchanged.~ 
The views of prominent Bulgarian intellectuals on the Kosovo conflict and 
Bulgaria's position are of particular interest here. Opinions against NATO campaign and 
the Bulgarian Government's support for it by far exceed those in their favor. For example, 
the writer Viktor Paskov wrote in Monitor: "This is prostitution. We whine for 
guarantees, which we are denied ... We whine for money, but this money will come only 
if we sell our body and The main argument behind most of these statements is a 
moral one, which makes this stand very attractive to the popular mind. Bulgarian 
ordinary people's natural fear of and disgust for violence and war are excellent ground 
Ibid. 
Monitor newspaper, Apr 29, 1999 4 
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for this type of arguments, which have definitely helped cultivate anti-war and anti- 
NATO attitude among the Bulgarian public. Notably, however, most of these stands 
show awareness of Bulgaria's limited options as part of the tragedy of the whole situation. 
In time, the aspect of limited options develops into increasing awareness of the 
alternatives with the help of statements by politicians from the ruling majority and (at the 
beginning less frequently) by intellectuals and public figures, who express - in one way 
or another - support for NATO and the Bulgarian Government. According to the writer 
Lyuben Dilov, for instance, ''the Balkan Peninsula may cease to be a European hotbed of 
conflict ... But this is obstructed by Pan-Serbian chauvinism ... Pan-Serbian chauvinism 
has instigated four wars in the past eight years.115 
While from time to time Standart News and Demokratsiya make up for the deficit 
of positive "home" messages with numerous reproductions of foreign articles. 
Interesting and symptomatic issue is how NATO military campaign affected 
NATO's image in the Bulgarian public and media. 
NATO air-strikes against Yugoslavia had given vent to the dissatisfaction, 
suppressed over the previous two years, of the more conservative part of the Bulgarian 
public with Bulgaria's commitment to NATO announced at the beginning of 1997. The 
change in the political situation in 1996-1997, when BSP lost its power and influence, 
imposed a moratorium on the expression of serious reservations to NATO, which was 
obvious from the house policies of dailies such as Douma, (Sega and Monitor started 
coming out in autumn 1998). In the course of the war in Yugoslavia, the anti-NATO 
' Standart News, Apr 29,1999 
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sentiments in these dailies escalated to the point of hysteria, presenting NATO as the 
main threat to peace. Growing anti-NATO feelings might also be observed in Troud and 
24 Chassa. 
The resurrection of the image of NATO as an aggressor among large groups of 
the public and in the press placed the pro-Atlantic and Pro-European part of the Bulgarian 
public in an extremely delicate situation. While critics of NATO and the West prevailed 
in most dailies, with few exceptions (Standart News and Demokratsiya), the advocates of 
the Allied campaign were hardly discernible against the general critical background. 
First there was the image of NATO and the West (mainly the US) as an aggressor 
and killer of innocent people. This image was consolidated by daily reports of destruction 
and civilian casualties. However, the thesis of NATO as a destroyer of democracy was 
the strongest from a moral point of view. According to this thesis, with its actions in 
Yugoslavia NATO actually destroyed the fragile democratic tendencies that emerged 
after the devastating civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, and placed the opposition 
against Milosevic in an extremely difficult situation. There is also the thesis that NATO 
attacks are strengthening Milosevic's dictatorial regime ("NATO Crucifies Democracy in 
Serbia," Sega, Apr 29), as the Serbs were obviously rallying around Milosevic: "The air 
raids have set the course towards democratization of Yugoslavia decades back ... The 
incumbent regime has only been strengthened by the NATO attacks against Yugoslavia 
because of the natural reaction of a nation to unite under the state banner in times of 
foreign aggression ... The democratic forces in Serbia have been weakened, and the 
democratic reformist Government in Montenegro has been imperiled by the Allied 
bombing. And now they are between the hammer of NATO and the anvil of Milosevic's 
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regime" (Sega, Mar 29th). Such point was quite reasonable: yet in the first days of 
NATO's intervention Milosevic's government stopped the broadcasting of the popular 
only opposition radio B92 and got rid of the main opposition leader Vuk Draskovic 
pushing him out from his ministerial seat. 
Arguments that the real motive for the strikes are Washington's ambitions to 
become the uncontested world leader, that NATO violates international law and its own 
statutes, that it is trying to replace the present world order by one of its own making, that 
it is helping the KLA, that it is double-faced, etc., prevailed in commentaries and 
analyses (especially in the pro-Serbian dailies). Against this background, positive views 
of the role of NATO and the West sounded much weaker. In time, these views have 
increased, but it is only towards the end of April that they emerged as a stable alternative 
to the flow of anti-NATO interpretations. 
B. THE POLICY OF THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT TOWARDS NATO 
AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CLASHES OVER THIS POLICY 
As early as 1990 the political and intellectual circles close to the UDF (in 
opposition at that time) created the Atlantic Club that did a great job in popularizing 
NATO and changing its image among the Bulgarian public. The end goal of the club was 
Bulgariajoining NATO. In the course of all the past decades these efforts faced a strong 
resistance dominated by the BSP (the former Communist Party). The obstacles created 
by the BSP and the reluctance of its governments hampered to a great extent the 
Bulgarian steps towards NATO membership. All the Bulgarian governments dominated 
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by UDF have lead a consistent, steady and desperate pro-NATO and pro-United States 
policy despite the strong opposition of the BSP, and despite of all the disappointing 
signals sent by the NATO leaders. When the UDF in a very dramatic way took the power 
from the socialists, it inherited highly aggravated relations with NATO officials. A lucid 
manifestation of the negative attitude was the United States demand and pressing on the 
Bulgarian government to scrap its SS-23 tactical missiles and to withdraw its troops from 
the southern border with Macedonia and Greece, to the rear behind Blagoevgrad. 
Certainly, the government rejected this humiliating demand, which in fact implied 
depriving Bulgaria of any real guarantees for its security: without its own effective 
defense, on the insecure Balkans, and outside NATO’s 
the war in Kosovo, for two years in power the governments of the UDF managed to make 
up to a certain degree the lag and to bring Bulgaria closer to NATO. The resolute and 
risky position of the Bulgarian government during the conflict in Kosovo ensured one of 
the most significant moves of the country towards NATO and EU membership. 
By the beginning of 
As early as March 1 6th, 1999 the Prime Minister Ivan Kostov told the Bulgarian 
Parliament that the Kosovo crisis affects Bulgaria’s national security because of the 
immediate vicinity of the region. In that speech, nearly two weeks before the beginning 
of NATO campaign, he also declared that Bulgaria would support the deployment of an 
international peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Bulgaria is ready to participate in such a 
mission under NATO command, noted the Prime Minister, adding that if Belgrade would 
continue to object to a NATO peace-keeping mission and if NATO is forced to mount an 
“United States Pressure on Bulgaria Backfiring.” Global Intelligence Update Stratfor, available in the 
Internet at: h~:il~~~w.stratfor.com’servicesi~iu~072897.as~ 
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operation without Yugoslav consent, the government will use the mandate approved by 
the Parliament in October 1998 to allow NATO air forces to use the Bulgarian air~pace.~ 
During that time WE, quoting domestic sources reported that Bulgarian-NATO 
preliminary talks about Bulgarian “logistic support” for the transit of NATO personnel 
across Bulgarian territory took place on March 1 lth-12 th. Almost 3 months later, on 
June 2nd, a government official denied, but the behavior and the statements of the 
Bulgarian Prime Minister and of the members of the government in March-April showed 
that such talks probably have taken place indeed. 
In April the Parliament of neighboring Romania denied granting air corridors for 
NATO military aircrafts, despite that the opposition socialist party generally supported 
Romanian membership in NATO. On the contrary, the Bulgarian ruling majority turning 
its back to the vicious resistance in and outside of the Parliament and to the media 
campaign got what it expected: on May 5th the Bulgarian parliament, after long and hot 
(but in vane) debate officially agreed to grant NATO aircrafts the right to use the 
Bulgaria airspace for strikes against Yugoslavia. Outside the building of the Parliament , 
thousands were rallying for and against the decision. 
During the debate in Parliament one of the leaders of the BSP, Alexander Lilov, 
was explicit: “This Balkan war is illegal, ineffective and destabilizing (for the region). 
Bulgaria should clearly say it is against this Balkan war because the Balkan problems will 
not be solved by military means.” 
Bulgarian Premier Urges Kosova Settlement, Radio Free Europe, Mar 17 1999, available in the Internet 
at: httr,:~/’lu~;u..rferl.or~~newsline/l999/03/170399.html 
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The argument of the Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova was that those who 
vote against granting NATO access to Bulgaria’s airspace, apart fiom the moral issue of 
silent complicity, would vote for prolonging the conflict and against a united Europe. 
“Such a vote will erase Bulgaria from the economic and political map of Europe.” Lilov 
replied that a vote to grant NATO access would not necessarily lead to ‘‘a quick 
admission to NATO and the European Union.” He warned that after the Balkan war is 
over, Bulgaria’s case could well become forgotten, even possibly weakening its regional 
position.’ Alexander Tomov, leader of the Euroleft’s (left-centrist parliamentary party, 
which voted against NATO’s access to the airspace) declared the position of his party: 
Bulgaria “should preserve and maintain its European and Euro-Atlantic choices, though, 
at the same time, we think that (Bulgaria) should not become involved, directly or 
indirectly, in the war.”’ A month earlier the BSP leader Purvanov stated, “Our position 
should be similar to that of Italy - non-interference, intemption of war operations and re- 
establishment of political dialogue.”” 
Many Bulgarians believed and still believe that this parliamentary vote was a 
post-factum formal act, and that in fact NATO bombers had already flown over Bulgaria. 
The government hriously denied this. One of the most dramatic parliamentary 
discussions was on this issue. It took place on April 2nd, more than a month before the 
official approval of NATO’s flights. The Prime Minister rejected the accusation by the 
Weydenthal, Jan and Stoyanka Kancheva, Yugoslavia: Bulgaria Grants NATO Access To Airspace - 
Grudgingly, WE, May 5 1999, available in the Internet at: 
h~://wm~.rferl.or~~nca~features.:’l999!05/F.RU.990505 13 1 3 9.html 
Ibid. 
lo h~:l!~~~.aim~ress.orgld~~trae!archive/data!199904!904 1 0- 0 1 -trae-sof.htm 
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socialist leader Purvanov that the government, violating the constitution, had approved 
NATO air-flights over Bulgaria. The later replied, “One of us is a liar - either I, or the 
Prime Minister, or Solana,” quoting a letter to the Premier Kostov, in which Solana 
thanked Bulgaria for the approved use of its air-space. As usual, the government 
overreacted. The minister of internal affairs Bogomil Bonev warned openly, “Anybody 
who is engaged in spreading lies that we have approved the air comdor or in any way 
attacked Yugoslavia, that we have taken hostile action against Yugoslavia, shall come 
under the jurisdiction of the criminal law which prescribes 5 to 15 years in prison for 
treachery of national interests.”” A few hours later, the Counter-intelligence Service and 
Ministry of Internal Affairs appeared with official warnings that spreading lies about 
approved use of the air corridor of Bulgaria was a provocation against the state and that 
their authors could be taken to court. The two government departments warned all the 
citizens to refrain from provoking anti-Bulgarian disposition in Yugoslavia.12 
However, NATO’s HARM missile that hit a house in Sofia suburb proved the 
opposition’s suspicions (along with a series of other evidences). The explanation by a 
NATO official that NATO aircraft launched the missile flying over the Yugoslav territory 
contradicts with the technical data. According to the consultation we made with a 
specialist from the Bulgarian Air Forces one day after the incident, the trajectory and the 
speed indicated that the missile could only have been unleashed by a plane within 25- 
miles radius, i.e., inside Bulgarian air space. The Bulgarian officer supposed that the 




Bulgarian territory. The pilot reacted immediately launching the missile toward the radar, 
but as the radar was turned off and the missile losing the target hit gone astray and hit the 
house. The Bulgarian anti-aircraft forces probably did not have in disposition the 
identification codes of the U.S aircrafts and this paradoxical situation led to the incident. 
The final accord of the Bulgarian support for NATO military campaign, 
surprising many observers, as well as the Russian government, was the blocking of 
Russia over flights to Yugoslavia at the end of the war in the first days of July. “Bulgaria 
will consider requests from Russia for over flight of its aircraft as part of KFOR after a 
full agreement is reached on the technical details of the implementation of the Helsinki 
agreement,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Radko Vlaikov said. He stated “an agreement 
should be reached on article four of the (Helsinki) accord, which stipulated the use of the 
airport in Pristina could be only under the orders of KFOR General Commander 
Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson”13. Meanwhile, Washington and NATO have asked 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to refuse Moscow’s over-flight requests. 
During the whole campaign the government and the ruling majority defended its 
policy against the domestic critics with the argument that backing NATO’s policy offers 
Bulgaria better prospects for the future, and that such a policy is the only chance for 
Bulgaria to make up the lag and to complete its strategic purpose: to join EU and NATO 
and to become a part of Europe. Indeed, in all their contacts and negotiations with 
NATO’s and Western leaders Bulgarian President, Premier, Foreign minister and all 
government officials emphasized Bulgarian will to join NATO and EU, and repeatedly 
’’ httD:N~~~~.chlnadaiIy.com.cn/~~o/crisis/m705D 1 O.htm 
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and openly made a clear link between the Bulgarian support and Bulgarian expectation 
for acceleration of the procedures for membership. 
In April 1999 Bulgarian President, Petar Stoyanov, probably was the first one 
who promoted the concept of a Marshall Plan for Southeastern Europe and suggested 
easing or rescheduling debts for countries bordering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY). Stoyanov appealed Europe to outline a vision for Southeastern Europe beyond the 
scope of the present conflict in Kosovo. He advocated an international solution not only 
for the Kosovo crisis but also for all regional issues. Bulgarian President urged a "broad 
investment program" backed by the governments of Western Europe and the United 
States. He also said that a greater integration with Europe is the answer to the "historic 
shadows" of ethnic rivalry and the legacy of communist rule plaguing Southeastern 
Europe. "We cannot and should no longer seek regional solutions only," said Stoyanov. 
These problems are "inevitably a part of the rest of Europe." l4 
However, despite the fact that the govemment policy regarding NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia finally to a certain degree has justified its purposes, the way in 
which incumbents conducted it was highly questionable. The style of the govemment 
decision making on this issue and its relations with the public contradicted in many 
aspects with the style, the traditions, and values of the western democracies. In this 
context some of the blames by the spokesmen of the opposition had certain point. They 
regularly pointed out as follows: 
The lack of consultations in the country 
Bulgarian President Speaks On Kosovo, Euro-Atlantic Ties (Press Briefing by Bulgarian President 14 
Stoyanov), United States European Command, Apr 26 1999, available in the Internet at: 
h ~ : ~ ! ' ~ ~ ~ ~ . e u c o m m i l i e u r o ~ e / b u l ~ a n a ~ u s ~ s ~ 9 9 a u ~ 2 6 . h ~  
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The failure to provide for any proper parliamentary debate before key decisions 
on NATO access to the air space was granted 
The dishonesty of all those politicians, who denied that such a request had never 
been made by NATO in the first place. For example, on March 9th the Government 
denied that it had been approached over the question of NATO over-flights. Even on 
April 5th the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott said that NATO had 
not asked Bulgaria for the use of its air space nor did it have any plans to do so in the 
future. 
One of the striking examples of the incumbents’ attitude toward the public was 
the fact that the Prime Minister even contested the reliability of public opinion polls 
(showing that the majority are against NATO strikes in Yugoslavia). This gave a good 
occasion to the daily Monitor to bite him with the generalization “A Prime Minister does 
not need public opinion polls to know what the people in his own country think.” (Apr 8) 
Probably without such a style of policy, because of the strong domestic opposition 
the Government would not be able to ensure Bulgarian support for NATO air strikes. 
This could explain, but barely can justify the government style of decision-making on 
such cruciaI issues. However, any western Government could hardly act in this way in a 
similar political and public environment without loss of its power. 
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C. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR BULGARIA 
1. Domestic Political Consequences 
Undoubtedly the support of the ruling majority for NATO air campaign resulted 
in certain decrease of its popularity. In the same time the war provoked awakening of old 
anti-NATO attitude in certain circles, and especially in the BSP and its electorate. During 
more than two years of the UDF rule that attitude had almost disappeared from the public 
space and existed latently. A similar trend of increasing negative attitudes we can see in 
the new NATO members in Central Europe, and even in such an old NATO Ally like 
Greece. This should be an important and symptomatic signal for the future NATO policy 
in the area, as well as its policy toward UN Security Council and toward Russia. 
However, the events after the end of the war: the political gains that Bulgaria 
received and the attention that it got from world’s leaders like Clinton and Blear led to a 
certain recovery of the image of the Bulgarian government and NATO. The temporary 
decrease of the popularity of the UDF government at that moment did not create serious 
threat for its power, as there was no other political force capable to take power and to rule 
the country. The main opposition party, the BSP still has bad image and low popularity 
after its catastrophic political and economic failure in the dramatic winter of 1997 when it 
was forced to accept extraordinary Parliamentary elections and reluctantly abandon 
power before the elections. 
If there is something that really decreased the popularity of the UDF government, 
it is not so much its pro-NATO policy during the military campaign, than the non- 
democratic, secret and anti-public way it conducted this policy: lack of transparency, 
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inadequate reactions, inadequate and incompetent information policy. A proof to this 
point is the present situation the Government is in. Now it is in the lowest point of its 
popularity, despite that the public recognized the obvious success of the main purpose of 
its backing NATO intervention -to attract the attention and the favor of Europe and the 
United States, and to increase the Bulgarian chances for EU and NATO membership. 
The reason for this state of the maters is again the same: the non-democratic style of 
governing, the series of public scandals about corruption of ministers, high government 
officials, and leading figures of the UDF. The Prime Minister was forced to make 
significant personal changes in his Cabinet. But he made them in the same non- 
transparent way, almost without any explanation to the public of the true reasons for 
these changes. Unfortunately, the public generally knows the reasons: corruption is 
shaking the government at all its levels. Because of this the popularity of this 
Government continues to scroll down, and the reactions of the incumbents are becoming 
more and more hysterical, seeking everywhere plots and evil scenarios. 
2. International Political Consequences for Bulgaria 
The resolute and risky support for NATO military campaign by the Bulgarian 
government indeed attracted to the country an unprecedented attention of the leaders of 
the main Western powers. All they repeatedly asserted that they will support the 
Bulgarian application for NATO membership. The procedure for EU received a sensible 
push forward. Bulgaria (together with Romania) was mentioned in the list of the serious 
candidates for the next round of NATO enlargement. For the first time in the Bulgarian 
history the United States President visited the country and gave it promises for broad 
political and economic support. One of the new initiatives, namely the Stability Pact 
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gave new chances for development of the country’s infrastructure and its connection with 
Europe. A whole list of United States initiatives for financial aid for Bulgaria has 
occurred. 
However, despite the demonstrated interest and good will toward Bulgaria, the 
main objective obstacles on the way to membership in EU and NATO remain and could 
be solved only by the Bulgarians and their government. Those are problems in the field 
of economic, structural and law reforms, problems related to ineffective (and not- 
working) economy, government, administrative, and judicial structures. One of the major 
problems that is very particular within the framework of the Stability pact - the problem 
with the corruption of the government structures, recently turned out to be the most actual 
and most dangerous for Bulgaria. Because of the series of scandal reveals of corruption 
among the members of the Bulgarian Cabinet and the top government agencies, recently 
the EU showed increasing reserves in regards to Bulgaria. One of the main and most 
dangerous issues is the corruption related to the privatization. For years, despite the clear 
and well-addressed critics, the incumbents showed reluctance to change the non- 
transparent and unclear system for selling the biggest Bulgarian assets. There is almost no 
big privatization deal without scandals, suspicious leaks of information or sudden change 
of the chosen purchaser. It was not by accident that most Bulgarians referred to, the 
Minister responsible for the privatization contracts, as “Mister Ten Percents.” This policy 
turned into the major obstacle for the foreign investments and the structural reform of the 
economy. 
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So, Kostov’s Government is on the way to misspend the actives it gained with its 
risky policy. What is disappointing the Bulgarian public now is disappointing for the 
European officials as well. 
NATO’s intervention resulting in breaking the territorial status quo and the 
sovereignty of Yugoslavia established a dangerous precedent that threatens the future 
stability and peace on the Balkans. Encouraged by the success of KLA in Kosovo, the 
growing population of Albanians in Macedonia, whose organization conducts a firm and 
offensive policy, might provoke violence throughout this country, ending up into a civil 
war. These fears are well formulated by the Macedonian analyst and politician Lyubomir 
Frachkovski in his article with the eloquent title “Stability Pact and the Problem of Ethnic 
 nation^."'^ A war in Macedonia can ignite a larger Balkan war, since in the course of 
this last century Macedonia has been the core of all the Balkan wars. Such upheavals are 
mostly risky for Bulgaria as compared to the other countries in the region due to its 
historical and cultural connection with Macedonia. 
The bad thing is that for the time being the Stability Pact much more looks like 
political and propaganda efforts. It is rather a bureaucratic activity without any contents, 
than real financial aid and real steps aiming at settling the problems on the Balkans. 
Before the beginning of this summer, the EU members and the United States denied to 
take any responsibility and to fimd the cleaning of the Danube and to restore floating on 
the river. While countries like Bulgaria continued to endure heavy losses because of this, 
the EU shifted the responsibility for this operation on Milosevic, knowing very well that 
’ httu : /!wwv-us. caoi tal .bg 
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Yugoslavia is not capable of accomplishing this task.I6 In that aspect the Bulgarian 
Foreign Minister Nadejda Michailova recently addressed delicate critics stating that 
nearly one year had passed after the Balkan Stability Pact was launched and the time has 
come “to transform the pact’s long term vision into concrete policy. 17 
The resolute support of the Bulgarian Government for NATO intervention in 
Yugoslavia and the fact that Bulgaria refused the Russians to use its air-space was 
interpreted by the politicians, public and media in Russia as a hostile act against Russia. 
Most probably this will have a long-term negative effect on the Russian- Bulgarian 
relations. These relations are still very important for the country, at least the economic 
aspect of the issue. By 1989, when the transition started the trade with the former Soviet 
Union was about 80 percents of the total Bulgarian external economic exchange. During 
the 1990s the share of the trade relations with Russia decreased, but this significant 
downfall was not compensated by a corresponding increase of the trade with other 
nations. A certain increase of the trade relations with the EU countries, Turkey and the 
United States occurred, but it was one-sided and led to significant passives in the external 
trade balance of the country. In fact, the decrease of the trade relations with Russia led to 
worsening of the economic performance of Bulgaria. The country lost the huge Russian 
market for food, tobacco products, wines, electronics, forklifts, and so on. Most of the 
economic sectors that were earlier directing their production to the Soviet market, 
collapsed. The Bulgarian Armed Forces and the Bulgarian Arms Industry also suffered 
l6 EU, NATO Stalling on Danube Clean-up, Global Intelligence Update Stratfor, available in the Internet 
at: httu:/~~~~.~tratfor.c0m’CISisuecialreuorts!suecial7.htm 
Bulgarian Foreign Minister in Washington, WE, 10 March 2000, available in the Internet at: 17 
httu://wm~.rferl.ordnewslinei2OOO/O3/4-see/see- 100300.html 
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damages because of its dependence on Russian supplies. The worst case was and still is 
in the field of energy, since Bulgaria is almost one hundred percent dependent on the 
supplies of Russian oil and gas. Russia used this dependence as a tool to press the 
Bulgarian government and even influence its internal policy. In 1997-1 998 the Russian 
economic empire Gasprom humiliated the Bulgarian UDF Government, put it on its 
knees, and forced it to accept the mediation of a Bulgarian semi-mafia economic group in 
supplying Russian gas. A number of times in the midst of winter Russia refused to 
supply oil for the biggest Bulgarian refinery cornering the country and its Government. 
Though the relations between the two counties were aggravated, soon after the war 
began the Russian company Lukoil privatized the biggest Bulgarian refinery. In fact 
Lukoil was aiming at that long before the war. They used all forms of pressing, 
connections in the financial and political elite, and all kinds of arguments, including the 
refinery’s debts to Lukoil in pursuit of their goal. Anyway, it is a fact that the Russian 
ownership of the refinery increases Bulgaria’s vulnerability fiom the Russian oil policy. 
The only way, for NATO and the EU to establish unchallenged influence in 
Bulgaria, and.to decrease the possibilities of Russia to interfere, is to diminish the 
country’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. First of all this means giving the 
country the chance to receive Iraqi oil supplies as a way to liquidate Iraq’s debt to 
Bulgaria; investment in the building of new refineries, able to work with Iraqi oil, etc. A 
quite good solution and an adequate award for the Bulgarian support could also be the 
building of an oil pipeline for delivery of Caspian oil to Europe, starting from Burgas 
(Bulgaria). Regretfully, quite recently the idea about a project like this was given up time 
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and again, most probably in favor of a Turkish pipeline. Although Bulgaria supported 
NATO military intervention, the country was left vulnerable and helpless against any 
possible Russian economic and political pressure and probable Russian economic 
revenge. 
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111. FORECASTS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA ON THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY 
By pounding away at the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, NATO had 
worn down not only its enemy but also some of its friends, Europe’s poorest states. The 
air raids on Yugoslavia had indirectly battered the countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe, destabilizing their export, tourism, river trade, and investments. Vital for the 
national development funds were diverted to help ethnic Albanians fleeing from Kosovo. 
Being seriously concerned for the economic impact of the Yugoslav War the 
governments of the Balkan countries alarmed NATO’s leaders, the IMF, and the World 
Bank. In the course of the war a great number of researches, estimates and forecasts for 
its economic consequences were conducted by these international institutions as well as 
by experts from the Balkan countries.’ In Bulgaria a number of independent experts, 
institutions and economic journalists also made their own analyses and interpreted the 
official prognoses.2 Some Western journalists and experts also analyzed the economic 
risks that the war can cause to B~lgaria.~ 
~ 
IMF, The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessment, May 25,1999, 1 
available in the Internet at: http:/ i~~~~.eurova.eu.int/co~~’d~laIsee:imf 25 may 99Jindex.htm 
IMF and World Bank, The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: A Preliminary Assessment of 
External Financing Needs and the Role of the Fund and the World Bank in the International Response. 
April 16, 1999, available in the Internet at: httD:!lwww.imf.orz 
Economic Consequences of the War and Reconstruction in South-Eastern Europe. The North Atlantic 
Assembly Report, NATO Economic Committee, 24 June 1999, available in the Internet at: 
httr>:llwwv.naa.be/~ublicationdcomrev/ 19991as 120ecew997-e.html 
Stanchev, Krasen (Director of the Institute for Market Economy in Sofia) “Influence of Yugoslav War on 2 
Bulgarian Economy.” Capital Press, Sofia, 5/5/99, available in the Internet at: http:!lwww- 
us.cauital.bglweekl~~99-16/32-16-l .htm 
Alexandrova, Galina “War in Yugoslavia Accelerates Problems in Bulgarian Economy.” Capita2 Press, 
Sofia, 4/17/99, available in the Internet at: 
h ~ : / l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - u s . c a ~ i t a l . b ~ ~ ~ e e k l v ! ’ 9 9 -  1311 5- 1 3-1 .htm 
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Now, a year after the beginning of the war and almost 10 months after its end, the 
serious gap between these forecasts and the postwar economic realities is obvious (at 
least in the Bulgarian case). The forecasts were much more pessimistic than the real 
outcomes turned out to be. What caused that serious difference? Should we blame the 
economic experts for it? To give an answer to these questions we should analyze not 
only the estimates, comparing them to the real economic process, but also the 
circumstances and the factors, which influenced these prognoses. 
A. FACTORS, INFLUENCING THE INITIAL ECONOMIC FORECASTS 
AND EXPECTATIONS 
These estimates were shaped and influenced by a number of subjective incentives 
and objective factors. Although the objective factors mattered mainly, the subjective 
incentives and attitude were not of minor importance. 
1. Domestic Subjective Attitude and Motives 
a) The Bulgarian public attitude towards the economic sanctions 
Initially, the Bulgarian public associated the economic impact of the war mainly 
with the impact of the embargo against Yugoslavia. On April 28‘h the Foreign Ministers 
Alexandrova, Galina “Embargo Bulgarian Style.” Capital Press, Sofia, 5/13/99, available in the Internet at: 
htt~:l!~~\.v-us.ca~ital.b~~~veeklvl99- 1702- 17- 1 .htm 
Clack, Albert “Kosovo crisis threatens Bulgarian economy: Prime Minister accuses Serbs of 
destabilization.” Emerging Economies Portfolio 1 April 1999, available in the Internet at: 
httD://www.emergingeconomies.net 
Bennett, Peter “The Danube Blues: Kosovo conflict exacts a high toll on region’s businesses.” In: The Wall 
Street Journal. Interactive Edition. May 3 1, 1999, available in the Internet at: httD:liinteractive.wsi.com 
-Matloff, Judith “KOSOVO war has broad economic implications for Europe.’’ April 28, 1999, available in the 
Internet at: httv:liw-w.nandotimes.com 
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of the European Union (EU) countries unanimously voted to stop the deliveries of oil for 
Milosevic’s regime and to increase the pressure on Yugoslavia’s trade. The EU imposed 
an economic embargo - fiom turning down the oil pipeline supplying Yugoslavia, to a 
restricted traveling regime for high-ranking officials and businessmen, related to 
Milosevic’s Government as well as fining those suppliers, spedition companies and 
bankers making deals breaking the ban. Bulgaria was the first one to ban the trade with 
Belgrade. With Government decree N80 the export of oil, liquid fuels and a great variety 
of chemical products to Yugoslavia was banned. By then there was only an arms 
embargo, in compliance with Resolution 1 160 of the UN Security Council. “The Cabinet 
simply copied the table of chemical elements adding all chemical compounds that the 
Ministers could think of and then banned them for export - that is the Bulgarian embargo. 
If any element was missed, this was because they were in a hurry. In fact the government 
decree is related to all the chemical elements,” chemical experts said.4 
The association of the war with an economic embargo gave rise to pessimistic 
sentiments, because of the attitude of the Bulgarian public towards economic sanctions in 
general. In the past decade Bulgaria participated in a series of economic sanctions, which 
seriously affected the national economy. The most extreme example is the continuing 
embargo against Iraq, making it impossible for this country to clear off a debt to 
Bulgaria, amounting to $1.6 billion. An amount like that is of great importance for 
Bulgaria, a country with $30 billion GNF, and a backbreaking foreign debt of $9 billion. 
Alexandrova, Galina “Embargo Bulgarian Style.” Capital Press, Sofia, 5/13/99, available in the Internet 4 
at: htt~:!/ww-us.ca~ital.bg/weeklv/99-l7/32-17-1 .htm 
33 
In addition to all that, Bulgaria is in a humiliating dependence on Russian oil supplies, 
while at the same time the Iraqi debt has to be paid with oil. 
b) 
When the Bulgarians hear the word embargo, they normally start calculating. In 
case like that a big part of the Bulgarian officials are mainly occupied with calculations 
and announcing the results on a daily basis. These figures can hardly be considered 
accurate, since too many factors have to be taken into account when determining the 
exact mount of the losses. The general impression is that the assessment of the losses is 
quite arbitrary and often there is a big difference in the expert analysis and the figures 
given by the state officials. The incumbents obviously try to use the embargo as an 
excuse for the failure of the reform and the mistakes in their economic policy. Suffice to 
look back a few years ago, when the head of the Agency for Economic Programming and 
Development, Ventsislav Antonov, was fired because the agency’s report on the 
economic situation in Bulgaria in 1993 claimed that the embargo was in fact favorable for 
the Bulgarian economy, although it was strongly linked to gray economy. 
The motives of the ruling politicians and the government officials 
Looking for domestic support, the Cabinet generated and overused the idea of 
compensations. “All the collected data concerning the losses we underwent will allow us 
to ask NATO and the European Union for compensations,” the Transportations Minister 
Wilhelm Kraus said. All the claims that the Bulgarian support for NATO will be taken 
into consideration and rewarded with a compensatory package sound naive in the context 
of all the previous experience - the international institutions are not so generous and in 
recent years the Bulgarian diplomacy showed that it is much better at losing rather than 
winning advantages in international negotiations. However, the Bulgarian officials 
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requested loans from the IMF in order to compensate for the lost revenues, which they 
claimed were averaging $1.5 million a day in the course of the war. 
2. The Evolution in the IMF Position and Its Incentives 
Initially, the IMF officials reacted in a typical for this institution manner. The 
IMF mission chief for Bulgaria, Yuha Kakhonen, said that Bulgaria couldn't rely on aid, 
provided by the fund. 
Nevertheless, the IMF changed its attitude and shortly after the outbreak of the 
war it presented A Preliminary Assessment of External Financing Needs and the Role of 
the Fund and the World Bank in the International Response (April 1 6th 1999). The 
document stated the need for discussions with officials fiom Croatia, Bulgaria, and 
Romania "to determine the modalities of the Bank support in response to the crisis." 
Soon after that, on April 23rd, the IMF in coordination with the World Bank worked out 
an assessment (EBM/99/48) of the economic impact with concrete figures for the 
necessary financial aid. On May Zth a new updated assessment was issued, where the 
figures were significantly increased. At this time according to the World Bank estimates 
the war was costing the region at least $1 billion in collateral damage and lost trade. In 
compliance with the assessments of the Western donors the rebuilding of the region after 
the war could cost up to $30 billion or more. 
This evolution in the attitude of the international financial institutions could have 
been partially caused by powerful political influence and pressure, but most of all it was a 
result of the frustrating immediate effect of the war during its first weeks. 
The traffic on the mighty river, meandering 2,850 kilometers across Central 
Europe and the Balkans before reaching the Black Sea, had stopped since the end of 
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March, when NATO began bombing. Six bridges that spanned the Danube between 
Vukovar, Croatia and Turnu Severin, Romania lied as tangled wrecks in the water. 
Much of the trade losses are incurred by the countries, which main transportation 
routes once passed through Serbia. Prior to the war, for instance, Bulgaria transported 
about 65% of its exports along the Danube. In April alone, the Bulgarian companies 
spent an estimated $8 million in re-loading their goods onto trucks and railroad cars. 
Macedonia and Croatia, for which Yugoslavia is a key export market, were also 
vulnerable. 
The Bulgarian logistics company Econt Trans, is a typical example of the 
devastating situation in April 1999. It normally arranges river transportation for 100,000 
tons of iron ore, 20,000 tons of steel products and 10,000 tons of chemicals from 
Bulgarian ports to customers in the West each year. “As you can imagine, it is difficult 
to arrange alternative transportation for 20,000 tons of steel in a couple of days,” says 
Tihomir Tiholov, the Manager at the company. “It will take may be two months to clear 
the Danube, then yet another one to re-establish the contracts we‘ve lost.” 
The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov, issued a warning that the economic 
risk for the country from the war in Yugoslavia is escalating. In a special address to 
Parliament after a meeting of the National Security Council, he said that by March 2gth 
Bulgaria had already suffered direct losses about DM 1 1,500,000 worth from the 
interruptions in railway, air and river transportation ($6,400,000). According to official 
statements, only the transportation losses until April 20th 1999 amounted to $10,000,000. 
Obviously, the situation seemed too devastating not only for Bulgaria, but also for 
the whole of Central and Southeast Europe. Therefore, facing the situation, and forced 
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by the complaints of the Governments of the countries in the region, as well as by the 
United States political pressure, the international financial institutions had no other 
choice but to adequately respond to and plan urgent measures. This turned out to be of 
crucial importance for the support of NATO policy in the area, and especially for its 
military intervention in Yugoslavia. 
Bulgaria is of some additional importance for the IMF, because of its 
commitments in this country. During the 1990s as a result of its foreign debts the country 
lost much of its economic sovereignty and grew more and more dependent on the IMF 
programs and decisions. Bulgaria caused a lot of problems to the IMF in the course of 
the past decade. At certain points the IMF programs for the country were close to failure. 
As a result, in 1997 under the IMF pressure a currency board was introduced in Bulgaria. 
As the economic reforms and the economic policies in the country are under strict IMF 
control, their failure would be highly unacceptable, since it would be subsequently 
considered an IMF failure. Anyway, there are enough failures and severe critics of the 
fundamentals of the IMF policy seriously shattering the image of this institution. 
According t the forecasts and expectations Bulgaria would suffer serious 
economic losses from the war in Yugoslavia (The country was classified in the second 
group of damaged countries). Bulgaria, which is undergoing structural reforms, for the 
very first two months of 1999 suffered approximately 18 % reduction in industrial sales 
in comparison with the same period of 1998. For Bulgaria the export losses from the 
Kosovo’s crisis range between $1 million and $1 -5 million daily. The expected losses 
were amounting to $260 million average per month, in case the war continues longer. It 
was expected that in the second half of April, if the war would continue, the deficit would 
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increase with $ 100 million by the end of May, and with $300 million, if NATO air 
attacks do not stop by the end of the year. 
A great number of subjective motives contributed to the pessimistic forecasts for 
the economic impact of the war. Despite all of them, the background for the pessimistic 
forecasts was external. All forecasts (IMF, NATO and domestic) were based on the real 
immediate impact of the war in April and May 1999, which was really threatening and 
destructive, and the character of the impact was quite obvious and undisputable. 
The negative effect on the local economies during the first month of the war was 
so impressive and so fiustrating that at the end of May 1999 it urged the main players on 
the international scene to summon a meeting in Bonn of eight of Yugoslavia’s neighbors, 
key donors and pan-European and international organizations. Among them were the 
EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the West European Union (WEU), the 
European Investment Bank, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
NATO, plus Japan and Canada. The meeting discussed and worked out what was called 
the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, or much better described as a “kind of 
Marshall Plan” for the Balkans. 
If the war would continue longer than six months its economic impact on the local 
economies would be really devastating. The problem with all the estimates was the 
extrapolation of all the devastating trends in the future. In other words, the main 
difficulty was to predict how long the war would last. This was the main uncertainty, 
causing in fact a gap between the forecasts and the real economic damages. 
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Facing this problem, the IMF assessments (as well as all other forecasts 
influenced by them) presented two scenarios differing in the assumed length of the crisis: 
prolonged disruption (Scenario A) and a quickly resolved crisis (Scenario B). For each 
scenario, these assumptions are uniformly much more pessimistic than in the first 
assessment in regards to both refugee numbers and the impact on trade. 
Scenario A assumes that the number of refugees outside Kosovo will peak at over 
1 million, about 100 thousand more than in the earlier assessment. In view of the 
estimated number of displaced persons in Kosovo, this assumption is obviously not the 
most pessimistic one. The majority of refugees are expected to stay in the six most 
affected neighboring countries during the remainder of 1999, with only a small 
proportion leaving for other countries. Reflecting the experience in Albania so far, a 
higher proportion of refugees is now assumed to reside with local families. For those not 
living with families, the associated humanitarian costs would rise sharply in the fourth 
quarter as winter approaches. As far as trade is concerned, Scenario A assumed that, in 
addition to no official trade with the FRY in the remainder of 1999, transit trade through 
FRY was blocked. In the earlier assessment, some modest possibilities for transit trade 
had been envisaged in the second half of 1999, but this would now seem inconsistent 
with the damage already inflicted to transit routes. 
Scenario B assumes that all refugees will return home during 1999, but also 
assumes that the process will be prolonged. In the revised Scenario B (the version from 
May 25th), repatriation only begins slowly in late summer and takes most of the fourth 
quarter to complete. As a result, and factoring in a higher peak number of refugees, the 
average number of refugees in the six most affected countries in quarters two through 
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four is twice as much as in the original scenario. Trade opportunities with the FRY are 
also assumed to be more limited than before, with the Scenario allowing for the revival of 
direct and transit trade with FRY at only 50 percent of their pre-crisis levels in the fourth 
quarter. 
As IMF experts predicted, “the likelihood that a significant number of refugees 
could begin to return home before the end of the summer (as it was predicted in the 
April’s assessments - D.R.) now (in May - D.R.) appears to be low.” 
1999 GDP growth projected 
prior to Balkan conflict 
Revised GDP growth estimate 
0.5% -1.5% 
B. IMF’S AND DOMESTIC FORECASTS FOR THE IMPACT OF THE WAR 
ON THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY 
Expected 1999 drop in exports 
-10% 
According to the IMF updated assessments, provided the conflict is not settled by 
the end of the year, the effects for and the damages on the balance of payment for 
Bulgaria, would be as follows: 
- Decrease of export at the amounting of $250 million; 
- Loss of one quarter of the expected incomes from tourism - $100 million; 
- Reduction of the incomes from transit and other travels - $12 million; 
- Increased travel expenses - $12 million. 
In May the negative economic trends during the war forced both the IMF as well 
as the Bulgarian Government to negotiate and to agree on revision of the projected 
figures of the national economy in the following manner: 
I I I I 
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These figures became a part of the issued on May 25th IMF updated assessments 
of the cost of the war incurred by the Balkan countries. 
The director of the Institute for Market Economy in Bulgaria, Krasen Stanchev, 
did one of the broadest and in depth forecasts for the impact of the war on the Bulgarian 
economy. Stanchev’s estimates for Bulgaria were based on the basis of his general 
forecast about the length of the war and about the long-term ethnic political situation in 
Yugoslavia. He predicted that the war would be a long lasting one. 
He also wrote: 
“It is difficult to say how long the war will last, what is the possibility for 
different post-war scenarios to take place, whether there will be another war (in any sense 
of the word). The short-term estimates of the war’s effects are hampered by factors 
simply rooted in the countries themselves preventing the compatibility of the offered 
goods and services. The possibility of the war being short is thought of as being an 
equally big wonder because this would mean that the Serb government would accept the 
requirements of the Rambouillet agreement.’’ 
Stanchev further assumed, “it is more likely that the war continues for a long 
time. It is possible that the war will continue with certain interruptions for a time 
between 6 months and 2-3 years.” According to him, there will be periods of halted 
military actions and within these periods the warring parties will prepare for their next 
step towards a satisfying solution of the crisis. 
This pessimistic picture is based on the theoretical analysis of the basic reasons 
for the ethnic clash and the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. They came as a result 
of the ethno genetic processes on the Balkans. The reasons for the outbreak of the war 
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must be sought in the establishment of the nation-states in the region - a process that in 
other parts of Europe took place between XVII and XIX century. According to Stanchev, 
this process is currently under way in Albania. (In fact, the national revival and the rise 
of the Albanian national consciousness started in the beginning of the XX century.) 
Yugoslavia, led by Milosevic and based on the Serb identity in the country and abroad, is 
protecting its national pride and territory. A1 least, this is what the people and politicians 
in Belgrade are trylng to suggest. Macedonia, which recently won its independence, 
faces the challenge of protecting itself. Most probably, in the near future Montenegro 
will also endeavor to form an independent state. Needless to say whatever the nation’s 
goals are, they are a poor excuse for the genocide and the ethnic cleansing. The problem 
is that it is difficult to uproot the memories of past violence when there is no unified view 
for a joint future and prosperity.” 
Obviously, when Stanchev was estimating a long war, he had in mind not only the 
concrete war in Kosovo, but also other future wars in Yugoslavia in general. That is why 
he concentrated on the worst scenario. 
In 1998 Bulgaria joint CEFTA and the expectations were that the trade with the 
Central European countries would increase twice. In December 1998, the trade with the 
countries in the region was 5.4 percent of the total trade, which means 5 1 percent 
increase for that year. It was expected that the war would most probably be an obstacle 
for this tendency to continue. Stanchev also wrote that the worst scenario for the 
development of the crisis was taken into account and this would serve as a starting point 
to build up a realistic picture of the short-term influence of the crisis on Bulgaria. 
Stanchev’s predictions for a short-term influence included: 
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- Cutting off the trade with the West 
- Lack of new commercial routes 
- Lack of revenues from foreign trade and transport. 
The amount of Bulgaria’s export for the EU, CEFTA and EFTA countries is 55.4 
percent of the total one. The relative share of import fi-om the same countries is 52 
percent. In the last four years the Bulgarian export depends about 80 percents on its 
import. In this case, the worst scenario means $2 billion deficit on the current account 
According to the author, the immediate effects must be sought in the following 
sectors: 
- Increased transportation expenses 
- Loss in revenues from tourism 
- Loss of markets 
- Decreased foreign investments 
- Additional expenses, related to accepting refugees 
From the afore-mentioned immediate effects, the easiest thing to do was 
calculation of the expenses related to the refugees. The increased transportation expenses 
could also be defined to a certain extent, while the losses in tourism were hard to be 
calculated. Furthermore concrete figures assessing the loss of markets cannot be 
mentioned. For sure the problem with foreign investments had to be considered 
separately. 
In compliance with the conventions signed by the country it had to accept 5,000 
refugees. The total expenses, calculated by the newspaper “Cash” amounted to 
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approximately $582,000 per month, which was 0.1 percent of the nominal GDP for 1999. 
Nevertheless, accepting such an amount of refigees would pose very mall risks. 
According to the expectations the biggest and the most significant losses would be 
in the sphere of transportation. For a very long time already the Bulgarian firms were 
active on international transport .markets. Due to the fact that these companies were 
competing on the international market until 1989 they were operating much more 
efficiently in comparison to the companies in other sectors. That is why the 
transportation companies adapted to the market shocks in the 90s 'much easier and 
without considerable losses. 
During the war in Kosovo the situation was totally different - we witnessed the 
physical closure of Yugoslavia (when the UN embargo trucks passed through the territory 
of the country thus saving time and fees). Navigation on the Danube was very difficult. 
The direct railways losses are constantly accumulating and will be soon calculated. The 
trains were still going through Yugoslavia, but with big delays and almost empty. 
Many airways moved on to the East and this tendency would continue unless a 
solution of the conflict is found. The foreign companies' planes flew over a small portion 
of territory of the country. The taxes were paid based on the weight and the territory they 
were flying over. There were no changes in the aircrafts taking off fiom Sofia airport, 
but many foreign companies cancelled their flights. Even Balkan Bulgarian Airlines 
cancelled some of their flights. 
The losses in the area of automobile transportation were the biggest. According 
to the initial data they amounted to DEM 2 million per day. The passing licenses were 
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redirected from Yugoslavia to Romania. The license quota was too small and 
respectively was spent very quickly. 
Romania gave Bulgaria 12 000 licenses without travel tax, 20 000 licenses with 
travel tax, and 2 500 licenses for third countries, half of them without travel tax. 
Moreover, 1000 licenses, valid for the 60 kilometers frontier zone were given and they 
were without travel tax. The routes of 27 international bus lines, going through 
Yugoslavia to Poland, Holland, Germany, Belgium, England, Austria, Switzerland and 
France, were redirected through Romania. This caused serious problems during the first 
days of the war, problems, related to the differences in the technical requirements. While 
Yugoslavia allows axle load up to 22 tons, Romania permits only up to 10 tons. That is 
why a great number of Bulgarian buses were stopped at the frontier and had to pay high 
fines. 
Due to the changed routes every time the traveling to Europe was increased with 
DEM 1000. The distances are bigger and the taxes - higher. Approximately, DEM 300 
more should be paid for fuel and DEM 700 - for taxes. These sums do not include the 
fines and the taxes not stipulated by the law, but which the drivers had to pay since they 
were forced to do so. 
The blocking at the border cross points inflicted additional losses. The long stays 
were fatal for the transportation of non-durable and perishable products. The main reason 
for the blocking was that only one single bridge connects Bulgaria and Romania . The 
two ferryboats, which served the line Vidin - Kalafat, were insufficient and they could 
not accept the heavier traffic of cars and trucks. 
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Officially the forecasts envisaged around 50 percent increase of the transportation 
expenses. The losses of all transporters were said to be $1.5-2 million per day. It was 
expected that with the time the real losses in land transportation would decrease due to 
the political pressure aiming at preventing the unofficial payments and other institutional 
relieves. The price for the railway spedition of one ton of freight through Romania was 
$3-$4. The transporting time increased with 4 days. 
Decrease in export and loss of markets. 
The expectations for greater losses were related to the new structure of commerce. 
More than 55% (about 60%, according to the Center for Study of Democracy; and 50.3%, 
according to Galina Alexandrova) of the Bulgarian export goes to Western and Central 
Europe, while during the crisis in 1994-1995 it amounted to 40%. 
The main trade routes connecting the East to the West go through Yugoslavia. 
The closed Yugoslav temtory sufficiently reduces the Bulgarian export capabilities. It 
was expected that if the crisis continues more than 2-3 months it would most likely have 
a negative effect on the balance of payments. Practically Bulgaria lost all its export to 
Yugoslavia. In 1998 Bulgaria’s export to Yugoslavia amounted to $95.53 million. A big 
downfall in Bulgaria’s export for Macedonia was also expected. In 1998 it was $97.8 
million but in fact more than 60 percent of it was re-export for Yugoslavia, which would 
be impossible if the trade between the two countries was blocked. According to different 
sources, between 50 and 60 percent of the Bulgarian export is directed to West European 
countries while the import amounts to 44.6 percent. Due to the increased costs and the 
long delays this export would sufficiently decrease. The shrinking markets are expected 
to result in production downfall. In fact, Bulgaria’s experience with the previous 
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embargo on Yugoslavia shows that quite the opposite can take place, provided military 
actions are followed by economic sanctions - under embargoes the illegal export and gray 
economy mark a significant increase. In 1994-1995, for the very first time since the 
changes made on November 1 Oth 1989, there was an increase in the Gross National 
Product of the country. This was as a result of the illegal export, mainly of oil products 
and nitrogen fertilizers for Yugoslavia and their re-export to Macedonia. In this 
particular period the shadow economy in Bulgaria mostly made its money and increased 
its influence over the economic life and the state structures. Galina Alexandrova and 
many other authors in Bulgaria wrote that the country was facing the same threat in 
1999.5 According to the auditor Emil Dimitrov every living soul is lined up waiting for 
the embargo. He also adds that corruption was at its highest peak at the time of the 
previous embargo. State structures gave no signs of readiness to react adequately to the 
problem. Nevertheless, such expectations were not justified because they did not take 
into account that the situation in 1999 was completely different from the situation during 
the war in Bosnia. Even one and the same authors, like Galina Alexandrova for example 
in other articles recognize this difference.6 
In 1993 the war was somewhere in Bosnia and the transportation was not affected 
that much. And there were no other reasons for tightening Bulgaria’s trade relations with 
Serbia other than the imposed embargo. There were certain trade restrictions but the 
infrastructure, the chain of contacts remained intact and this made the deliveries in the 
Alexandrova, Galina “War in Yugoslavia Accelerates Problems in Bulgarian Economy.” 
Alexandrova, Galina “Embargo Bulgarian Style.” 
See also: Yovo Nikolov “Corruption - Biggest Threat for Embargo Against Yugoslavia.” Capital Press, 
Sofia, 5/13/99, available in the Internet at: httu://wuw-u~.cauital.b~/weeklvi99-l7/3 1-1 7-l.htm 
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embargo zone possible through re-export, humanitarian deliveries as well as through 
semi- legal and illegal channels. Practically, there was no border between Macedonia 
and Yugoslavia, while Serbia, which did not suffer any damages as a result of the war, 
was a solvent market and the export resulted in huge profits. That is why a small part of 
the Bulgarian companies, which traded with Yugoslavia, decided to direct their export to 
the West. Most of them have simply chosen to change the check- point instead of the one 
entering Belgrade they chose the one to Skopje, and from it again to Belgrade. Officially, 
the state supported the embargo and observed it strictly. Unofficially, the embargo was 
violated with the help of the incumbents. In 1999, the situation was very different. The 
war was in Yugoslavia itself and NATO air strikes were destroying companies vital for 
the Yugoslav economy as well as the infrastructure connecting the Balkans with Western 
Europe. Transport was re-directed to roundabout routes because it was dangerous to go 
through Yugoslavia, although the traffic through the country was not banned. After the 
destruction of the bridges on the Danube going through was entirely impossible. In 
March 1999, people running small businesses, who still remembered the previous 
embargo, were getting ready for illegal trading. But with small deals the difference in 
prices and profits is so small that it is not worth the risk, whereas for the big deals there 
are special legal channels for import. The previous embargo was economic and came 
into force with UN imposed sanctions. In 1999, the embargo was partial: it was related 
only to petrol and its derivatives and was imposed by the EU Council of Ministers. Only 
the European Union member countries approved it, whereas countries like Ukraine, 
Russia and China did not even intend to observe it. In this way a great deal of the routes 
for petrol delivery to Serbia remained open. 
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Another substantial difference was that the violation of the previous embargo had 
become a national policy or at least, the state had nothing against the violation of the 
sanctions by companies close to Berov's Government (then in power). In the case of this 
embargo the incumbents declared that they would observe the ban on oil export to 
Yugoslavia and it sounded quite serious. The fact that NATO satellites or their special 
planes could register any violation of the sanctions executed by Bulgaria would 
negatively affect the endeavors of the incumbents to bring Bulgaria into the Atlantic and 
European structures. 
Thirdly, in 1999 Macedonia was in a completely different position and could 
hardly be expected to have such a free trade policy as it did earlier. In 1997- 1998 
Bulgaria's trade with Serbia was relatively low. In this situation, the Bulgarian embargo 
on Yugoslavia was not such an effective tool for economic pressure. It was rather a 
demonstration of political measures, aimed at confirming Bulgaria's support for NATO. 
The loss of markets was expected to be mainly in the EU and CEFTA countries. 
According to the forecasts of Krasen Stanchev, these losses could be compensated to a 
certain extent by regaining our positions in Russia and the countries of the former USSR. 
This reorientation would save immediate trade losses but will probably have negative 
institutional consequences at the level of company strategy. The problems are related to 
a decrease in compatibility at a later stage. (The relations between Bulgaria and Russia 
were aggravated by the Bulgarian position towards NATO. This affected to a certain 
extent the trade relations between the two countries.) 
Losses in tourism could not be calculated partly due to lack of information about 
this sector. Tourists from Yugoslavia and Macedonia generally amount to no more than 
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8-10 percent of the total number of tourists in Bulgaria and they usually visit family 
hotels. To a certain extent the competitiveness of the Bulgarian tourism depends on the 
fact that the prices are similar to those in Greece but the quality is far from being the 
same. 
Internal barriers: In the other sectors, as is the case of tourism, there are internal 
institutional impediments for their development. Railway transportation is rendered more 
expensive but the problem with it was the difficulty to find routes alternative to the ones 
going through Romania. Another example: the fees at Varna and Bourgas ports are 
similar to those in Thessaloniki and the Aegean Sea, but, at the same time, they are three 
times as much as the fees in the Romanian port of Konstantsa. A research carried out by 
the IME and the American University pointed to the transport expenses that could have 
been, but were not reduced by the Bulgarian land transporters, ports and the Bulgarian 
State Railways. The Black Sea transportation is much more expensive than that in 
Western Europe. The difference is very big - $2.56 for one kilometer compared to $0.36 
in the Mediterranean. A possible reason is the operational inefficiency; another one is 
limited capacities, resulting from incompetent management. The internal obstacles 
hamper the compatibility of the Bulgarian products. According to a poll carried out by 
the IMF the productivity of the private companies is 30 percent more than that of state- 
owned companies. The state monopolies in the energy sector are effective creditors of 
the state sector: their effective (quasi-fiscal) subsidy and delayed payments to creditors in 
1998 amounted to more than 900 million DEM. In other words, this is one fourth of the 
forecasted losses in the case of the worst scenario. This figure is more or less equal to the 
most pessimistic scenario for a deficit on the current account for 1999. 
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Losses resulting from decrease in foreign investments and decrease of the 
investors' confidence in the area: 
At a special session of the Parliament the Prime Minister pointed out that the 
effect of the Kosovo crisis might jeopardize Bulgaria's market reforms, which to a large 
extent depend on attracting foreign investment. 
A decrease of direct foreign investments, amounting to $200-400 million was 
expected. The emission of euro bonds for $200-250 million was postponed. The experts 
envisaged up to one-sixth reduction of import of capital goods, which is much lower as 
compared to 1998. The International Monetary Fund experts came to the conclusion that 
in case the war was prolonged the financial deficit for Bulgaria would be up to $300 
million. 
As early as the beginning of the war the fears that the level of confidence in the 
region would decrease were proved. On April lSt, while most emerging market bond 
prices edged slightly higher, Bulgaria's outstanding bonds drifted lower, reflecting 
concerns over the spill over of the conflict in Kosovo. Within the 3-4 days before the 
beginning of the air strikes against Yugoslavia, the price of the Bulgarian Brady Bonds 
had decreased by four points. The ratio between the exchange rates of the dollar 
considerably increased. 
A survey, made by the Bulgarian International Business Association, among 
foreign businessmen, showed that not a single foreign investor, already working in the 
country was not considering any change of plans or leaving the country because of the 
war in Kosovo. However, it was expected that the military conflict would repel the new 
investors intending to invest in Bulgaria. A proof of it was the withdrawal of the 
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American Pharmaceutical Company ICN Pharmaceuticals, which signed an agreement 
for the main share of the factory for veterinary medicine supplies “Biovet” - Peshtera, at 
the amount of more than $13 million. 
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IV. REAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR FOR BULGARIA 
A. SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC IMPACT 
Fortunately the war finished by mid June and lasted less than two and a half 
months. This was the main reason for the gap between the pessimistic estimates and the 
real damages. Most probably due to this fact after so many preliminary estimates about 
the negative economic impact of the war there are not many substantial analysis of the 
real impact, based on the interpretation of economic performance at the end of 1999. 
According to the official tally, the economic damages for Bulgaria were 
somewhere along the lines of DM170 million ($85 million according to the present 
exchange rate). In that aspect, Galina Alexandrova, the only author who argued that the 
negative impact of the war would not be so significant, should be pleased. As it turns 
out, “the war’s effect was more psychological than real. A rise in the trade deficit was 
going on well before the crisis hit, and its rise after the first Tomahawk hit on March 23rd 
was only slightly faster. Only the cheapest exports competing solely on price were 
affected by greater shipping costs, and in fact, at least one sector, tourism, supposedly 
even profited as tourists left countries perceived to be in the war zone, like Croatia for 
example. Following Milosevic’s tactical capitulation, Kosovo rapidly faded from sight, 
and even Sofia’s clamor for some kind of reparations for economic damage tapered off.’’ 
Alexandrova’s main point that the problems in the Bulgarian economy are caused 
by lack of decisive and competent domestic policy of reforms, by state monopolies, 
bureaucracy and corruption sounded quite reasonable. But her assertion that the war 
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would only catalyze these problems, raising the price that the country would pay for the 
delay of the reforms, was too arbitrary and one-sided. It could have been reasonable in 
case the war was short (as in fact it was), but if the prognoses for a long lasting war were 
realized, the effect of the war would have really been destructive and devastating, no 
matter how successful the reforms were before the war. Therefore any sarcasm and 
spiteful satisfaction seems at least out of place. 
' The statistical data at the end of 1999 showed at least two aspects not supporting 
her points: 
First, there is an obvious aggravation of the economic performance of the country 
in the second quarter of the year, when the war took place; 
Second, the data about the second half of the year showed real growth, which 
happened for the first time during the post-totalitarian period (excluding the period of the 
embargo-trade during the war in Bosnia). This justifies the policy of the government, 
despite of all contradictions, corruption scandals and others. 
Another broadly tackled problem was how reliable was the data of the National 
Statistic Institute (NSI)? But in spite of all doubts and reserves, this is the only available 
source, and it proves the relative success of the Government policy. 
The gross domestic product increased by two percent in the first nine months 
of 1999, according to the data of the NSI. Calculated in current prices the GDP 
reached almost 16.12 1 billion Leva, which means 1,952 Leva per capita. The striking 
fact is that after the end of June the NSI registered an abrupt increase of this index. The 
GDP increased by 4.5 percent for the third quarter of 1999 as compared to the same 
period in 1998. For the sake of comparison, the GDP increased only by 1.6 percent in the 
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second quarter of 1999, which was explained with the effect of the Kosovo crisis. This 
forced the Government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to amend the 
forecasts for the expected growth of GDP from 4.0 to 1.5 percent for the whole 1999. 
The main reason for the increase in GDP is the increase in investments and 
consumption as well as the improved efficiency of production due to the 
restructuring of economy. “The economic growth results mainly from the transfer of 
activities from the unproductive and inefficient state-owned sector to the highly efficient 
private sector,” Mariela Nenova, head of the Agency for Economic Analyses and 
Forecasts, pointed out.2 
The NSI also registered the amount of the gross added value realized by the 
different branches and sectors of the economy. It increased by 1.6 percent for the period 
January-September. The gross added value increases by 4.7 percent for the third quarter 
of 1999 as compared to the same period of 1998 (and accounts for 88.6 percent of GDP). 
The margin to 100 percent is due to indirect taxes and import duties. According to the 
data of the NSI for the third quarter of 1999 the performance of the agricultural sector 
seems very good. This sector accounts for over 26 percent of the added value. The 
explanation is that over the period July-September the harvest was gathered. This 
increase is due to the improved ratio between production and expenses made rather than 
to the greater amount of agricultural produce. Still the results of the sector are improving 
Gerkova, Dessislava “National Statistics Institute Registers Two Percent Growth Until End of I 
September.” Capital Press, Sofia, 1/29/00, available in the Internet at: 
httD://wm~-~~s.ca~ital.b~/m~eeklv!OO-O2/ 14 2.hm 
Gekova, Desislava and Boyan Kolev “Growth Expectations Exceed Growth Itself.” Capital Press, Sofia, 2 
1/29/00, available in the Internet at: 
htm:i/w~w-us.cauital.bdm~eeklv/OO-O 1 / 12- 1 .htm 
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- the added value has increased both in the third quarter (by 6.8 percent) as well as in the 
first nine months of 1999 (by 6.7 percent) as compared to the same time span in 1998. 
The services also registered an increase by 6.3 percent for the third quarter of 1999 and 
by 2.7 percent for the first nine months of 1999. The performance of industry, however, 
was not so good. In the third quarter of 1999 the added value in the industry dropped by 
one percent, mainly due to the negative influence of the plants from the processing 
industry, while in the period January-September, there was a four-percent drop. The 
striking fact is that the private sector, which accounts for 72 percent of the total added 
value of the national economy, has greater influence on the changes registered in the 
added value. 
The new data of the NSI confirms the trend of keeping a negative foreign trade 
balance. For the period July-September the import exceeded the export by 88.6 million 
Leva and for the first nine months of 1999 - by 1,139 million Leva. Despite the increase 
in export in the third quarter of 1999, for the whole period January - September it marked 
a nine-percent drop as compared to 1998. As far as the import of goods and services goes 
it increased by 3.9 percent in comparison to 1998. 3 
According to data provided by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), in the first 
three months of 1999 the balance of payments showed a deficit of slightly more than 
$300 million. In reality this had nothing to do with the war in Kosovo, which started on 
March 24th. This data showed, and in that Alexandrova was right, that the problems of 
the Bulgarian economy started long before the bombings in Yugoslavia. According to 
the BNB data, the deficit on the current account amounts to $233.6 million. The balance 
Gerkova, Dessislava “National Statistics Institute Registers Two Percent Growth Until End ...,, 3 
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on it deteriorated with more than $144 million compared to the same period in 1998. The 
main factor for that is the deterioration of the trade balance, which for the first three 
months of the year is minus $143 million. The drop in export in the period, however, is 
not caused by the war in Kosovo, but by the poignant problems that Bulgarian economy 
experienced. In practice, the Bulgarian industrial products could not be sold abroad 
because of the obsolete technologies, the material and labor consuming production. The 
advantage of the low wages has long been overshadowed by the negative factors - old 
technologies and lack of money for investments. That these factors had piled up for years 
makes them even more difficult to be settled and thus they turn into a problem causing 
concerns in all sectors of the economy. The data on the sales proceeds of industrial 
companies for the first three months of 1999 confirms the negative tendency and the 
worsening conditions in the real sector of economy. 4 
In fact, the parameters of the balance of payments improved in February as 
compared to January and then in March as compared to January. At that time it was 
believed that the improvement was not a stable tendency. Regretfully, the outbreak of the 
war made impossible to accept or deny this point. The data for April considerably 
darkened the horizons again. The Trade Ministry announced in April that the balance of 
payments suffered $70 million monthly losses as a result of the Kosovo war. The data in 
the beginning of April pointed yet another problem which was said to have come onto the 
scene as a result of the Kosovo crisis. And more particularly the amounting to 
approximately $26 million loss for the first quarter the Services realized. According to 
“Balance of Payments Shows $300 Million Deficit Even Before Kosovo War.” CapitaI Press, Sofia, 
6/14/99, available in the Internet at: httv:ilw~~-~~s.car,ital.b~~~eekl~/99-22/03-22-1 .htm 
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the calculations of the Central Bank it resulted from the lower proceeds from transport 
services and tourism. In fact, all these calculations were made before the influence of the 
Kosovo conflict was estimated. Having this in mind, it is frightening to think how would 
the balance of payments for the first half of 1999 look like. Peter Stella, the IMF 
representative for Bulgaria, said, as quoted by Reuters, that in April the current account 
will show bigger deficit than previously estimated. 
Indeed, the accumulated deficit on the current account of the balance of payments 
for the first eleven months of 1999 amounts to 543.7 million dollars, according to 
preliminary data published by the BNB. For the same period of 1998 the balance 
registered a surplus of 62 million dollars. In November the deficit on the 1999 current 
account amounted to 107 million dollars, which was the second biggest after the one 
registered in January 1999. The aggravation is mainly due to the negative trade balance. 
The lower revenues from services also have a negative influence. 
The deficit on the trade balance over the period January-November 
amounted to 925.3 million dollars, which is 7.6 percent of the 1999 projected GDP. 
It is expected that the trade deficit for the entire year would probably exceed one billion 
dollars. The govement's projections for 1999 as far as the trade deficit is concerned 
were to the tune of 667 million dollars. 
The deficit on the current account is compensated for by the registered surplus on 
the financial account of 459.3 million dollars. Direct investments in Bulgaria totaled 
665.5 million dollars for the first eleven months of 1999. The increase in comparison 
with the same period of 1998 was 182 million dollars. The biggest increase was 
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registered in the amount of internal company credits lent by foreign firms, which is also 
considered direct investment. In November alone the direct investments totaled 157 
million dollars, including the privatization proceeds from the Neftochim oil refinery (80 
million dollars) and Expressbank (29.2 million dollars) deals. And over the period 
January-November the Bulgarian portfolio investments abroad increased by 2 1 1.4 million 
dollars. 5 
B. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY 
Despite some negative effects of the war on the foreign investments, which were 
foreseen, the brave and risky official policy of support for NATO’s intervention 
gained for the country political dividends, which for the first time during its post- 
communist history seem not to be only a virtual and humiliating tapping but real 
dividends directly transferable in immediate and long-term economic gains. In other 
words, the economic damages that the war caused might be justified and compensated by 
strategic gains. 
At the December loth Summit of the EU Council of Ministers, Bulgaria and five 
other countries were invited to begin accession negotiations. Such an act of approval is a 
public relations coup, allowing the country to distance itself from weaker emerging 
markets and latch onto the trail of bright stars like Poland. Quickly forgotten was the 
price Bulgaria had to pay: the shortening of the planned service life of four reactors at 
Kozlodui. Undoubtedly this will spur conservation efforts, a good thing for an energy- 
Kolev, Boyan “Trade Deficit Approximates One Bn Dollars.” Capital Press, Sofia, 3/10/00, available in 
the Internet at: httv://www-us.capital.bdweekly~OO-O8/l7-8.htm 
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inefficient country, but it also certainly means more reliance on brown coal and 
ultimately an end to the cheap electricity. At the same time, when the country’s products 
are expected to face the full brunt of competition in the EU, they will have to do so when 
one of the main inputs becomes more expensive. 
United States President Bill Clinton’s November visit to Sofia provided yet 
another positive effect. For once, the Bulgarians were able to bask in praise for their 
political and economic progress over the past ten years. Following up on the goodwill 
generated by the visit, investors’ conferences were held and OPIC funds were granted, 
but more such efforts are needed to create better ties between the United States and 
Bulgaria. 
Another positive development was the noticeable surge in privatization. 
Numerous plants were booted out the door and the responsibility for bringing them back 
to life fell on private shoulders, many of them foreign. Neftochim refinery was sold to 
Russia’s Lukoil for $107 million (this makes Bulgaria much more vulnerable and 
dependent on Russian oil supplies), while Balkan Airlines went to Arkia and Zeevi of 
Israel. In the fertilizer sector, electronics plant DZU of Stara Zagora went to Videoton of 
Hungary, three pharmaceutical plants were sold to Balkanphma, and the Petrol chain of 
filling stations went to International Consortium. In the financial sector Hebrosbank was 
sold to Regent Pacific and Expressbank to Societe Generale. 
1999 was also a boom year for foreign investments in infrastructure. The ground 
was broken in October on the $220 million Gorna Arda hydropower complex, which is 
part of a bizarre agglomeration involving the National Electric Company, its Turkish 
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counterpart, and Ceylan Holding, which will build a highway in Bulgaria to pay for the 
electricity exports sent eastward! 
However, up to now the biggest deal in the infrastructure remained elusive: long 
time (since the communist era) absolutely no progress was made on the construction of a 
second bridge over the Danube. Bulgaria obviously has a strong case for putting it at 
Vidin, and the war in Kosovo proved this point, but Romania did not budge from its 
position one iota, refixing to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the spirit of 
cooperation following the Kosovo crisis. Fortunately, during the recent weeks good news 
has come: at last an agreement was reached with Romania about the second bridge on the 
Danube at Vidin. Undoubtedly, if this news is correct and the agreement is conclusive, 
the success should be explained with effect of the recent war. The economic problems 
that the war caused have proved the rationality of the Bulgarian point for bridge at Vidin 
connecting this area directly to Central Europe. The political dividends gained by 
Bulgaria during the war helped its stand in the course of the negotiations. Most probably 
an eventual Romanian compromise on that subject could be a result from the political 
pressure from the E.U. and the United States. 
Several other significant strides were made in foreign investments. Although 
nobody ever officially explained why it took so long, Rupert Murdoch’s Balkan News 
Corporation finally passed most of the hurdles on the way to becoming the first national 
private TV broadcaster. Although the process was not finalized during 1999, Bulgaria is 
never hurt when a big name makes an investment there. In addition, a strong contender 
Hein, Bill “The Bulgarian 1999: A Look Back to the Ups and Downs of the Past Year.” American 6 
Chamber of Commerce in Bulgaria Magazine, available in the Internet at: 
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like Murdoch will brighten the TV market for viewers and advertisers and shake the 
dullness of the competitors. 
Another business deal of note was that American Standard also announced plans 
for its third factory worth $1 8 million in the Gabrovo region. The March debut of 
Germany’s Metro will also have a widespread effect on the economy. Besides being a 
significant investment, the hypermarket chain is introducing numerous innovations to 
Bulgaria, such as detailed receipts, a low-margm, high-volume sales strategy, and mass 
mailings of colorful catalogs. 
Meanwhile, many chances were missed, not because of the war in Kosovo 
aggravated the investment climate, but because of the lack of transparency in the 
privatization, Government corruption (total corruption was the reason for the recent 
radical changes in the Cabinet), heavy and clumsy bureaucracy, huge tax burden, and 
other reasons that have nothing to do with the war. 
Cliffhanger talks with Erdemir of Turkey concerning the sale of Kremikovtsi, a 
behemoth steel plant with 17,000 workers, ended in failure. Instead, the works was sent 
off to an uncertain future in the hands of the Bulgarian Daru Metals. The dark horse 
among the stiff competition, the Anglo-American International Water, was granted a 25- 
year concession to manage Sofia’s water supply. It offered to invest $152 million, just a 
tiny bit over the minimum requirement, and to likewise keep water prices for residents as 
low as possible. The biggest deal, “the pearl in the crown” of the Bulgarian privatization, 
the half-a-billion dollar sale of the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company (BTC), 
proved to be elusive. Perhaps not coincidentally, this deal was also one of the most 
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secretive. Recently, a few months after the fall of the man most personally related to the 
deal, the ex-vice-premier Evgenii Bakurdjiev, information was circulated that at last the 
BTC will be sold for $0.6 billion. During the first half of the 1990s, when the procedure 
and the negotiations for the BTC have started the company was estimated between $2 and 
$3 billions. The last fact shows very clearly that the policy of the Bulgarian 
Governments during the 1990s, the corruption and the bureaucracy have caused damages 
to the Bulgarian economy that are much more sufficient in comparison to the damages of 
the recent short-lasted war in Yugoslavia. 
No matter that the war ended nine months ago the Bulgarian transportation 
companies continue to register losses, because of the destroyed infrastructure of 
Yug~slavia.~ Though the problem remains in a long-term perspective. Until Milosevic is 
in power, the Balkans will never be a hotspot for investment. Yugoslavia is a black hole, 
isolated from infrastructure projects tying the region together, and stands between 
Bulgaria and Western Europe. 
One of the possible solutions is building new huge infrastructure projects, 
which would decrease the vulnerability of Bulgaria, and of the whole region, and 
would help to attract foreign investors. At least, this is the main idea of the National 
Economic Development Plan of the government for the period 2000- 2006, which is 
being updated after the recent Cabinet changes. Quite logically, one of the priority 
sectors is infkastructure. It takes a lot of time and costs as well as a lot of money to build 
decent roads. For example, the construction of a kilometer of motonvay costs some $3 
’ Kanchev, Nikolay “Gubim Tranzitni tovari zaradi Serbia.” (in Bulgarian: “We are losing fkeights because 
of Serbia.”) Pari nespaper, Sofia, 12 Jan 2000, available in the Internet at: httD:/!vi.w7N.news.pari.bg 
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million. Bulgaria needs to improve its road network but is unable to finance it by itself. 
Only in 1999 several projects started 20 years ago were finished, such as the construction 
of the Southern Ring Road of Veliko Tumovo (my birth town in Northern Bulgaria) and 
the Rodopi overpass near Plovdiv (in Southern Bulgaria.) Some 1050 km of road were 
reconstructed. 8 
It is not possible to realize such tasks with Bulgarian (or other Balkan countries’) 
resources only. This should one of the strategic tasks not only for the Bulgarian and for 
the other Balkan countries’ governments, but also for the international financial 
organizations, the EU and others. This strategic paradigm became a key element of the 
post-war reconstruction programs and of the so-called “Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe.’’ Foreign financing and involvement of local companies for implementing 
these projects would have an additional favorable effect on the Bulgarian and other 
Balkan countries’ economies in transition, disrupted after the failure of the central 
planning system and weakened by the war. 
* Ivanov, Konstantin ‘‘Infiasmcture projects in Bulgaria Lead to Better Investment Climate, More Jobs.” 
American Chamber of Commerce in Bulgaria Magazine, available in the Internet at: 
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V. ECOLOGIC DAMAGES AND THEIR POSSIBLE LONG-TERM EFFECT 
ON THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY 
Finalizing the analysis of the economic impact of the war in Kosovo on the 
Bulgarian economy, it is worth mentioning that not a single economic expert, a 
representative of the government institutions, and the expert commissions of the 
international organizations has taken into account and has made any assessments of 
the long-term economic impact of the ecologic damages caused by NATO bombings, 
though it is difficult to come up with detailed figures. At least it needs a particular 
detailed expert analysis. 
However, even a non-expert glance at the facts shows that Yugoslavia has 
suffered heavy ecological damages (some critics even estimate them as an ecologic 
catastrophe). Some of these damages affect also to a certain degree some areas in 
Bulgaria as well. 
A preliminary report on the environmental impact of the war in Yugoslavia, 
prepared by the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) in 
compliance with a contract with DG-XI of the European Commission, released on June 
2Sth, and presented to the EU Council of Ministers, ascertains that “the long-term public 
health and the environmental effects in Yugoslavia and throughout the Balkans are 
potentially catastrophic.”’ At least 23 petrochemical plants, oil refineries and fuel storage 
depots in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were bombed, as were at least another 121 
The full text of the REC report can be found on the Internet at: 1 
htm:!/w.wcv.rec.ordREC~Announcements/vuzo!contents. html 
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major industrial plants containing various chemicals and substances dangerous for the 
human health. Thousands of tones of highly toxic chemicals were uncontrollably 
released into the air, soil and water. 
These are some of the facts presented in this report: 
As a result of the bombing of the industrial complex in Panchevo (1 5 km north- 
east from Belgrade) “ethylene-dichloride, ethylene, chlorine, chlorine-hydrogen, 
propylene and vinyl chloride monomers were released into the atmosphere, water and soil 
due to bombardment damages and now pose a serious threat to human health in general 
and to the ecological systems locally and in the broader Balkan region.” 
1,000 tones of ethylene-dichloride, close to 1,000 tones of a 33 percent hydrogen- 
chloride solution and 3,000 tones of natrium hydroxyde were released into the Danube, as 
well as 100 tones of ammonia, and tens of tones of chlorine, together with undetermined 
quantities of mercury. Ethylene-dichloride, considered a probable carcinogen, is known 
to cause damage to the kidney and liver. More than 1,000 tones of vinyl chloride 
monomer (VCM) were released. A VCM concentration of 10,600 times above safe 
levels was recorded a few kilometers away from the plant. VCM is a known carcinogen 
and that many scientists believe there is no safe level of exposure. 
“While Pancevo was the city most seriously affected by pollutants released by 
NATO strikes, similar refineries and depots were hit at: Lipovica, Belgrade (several), 
Bogutovac, Smederevo (several), Novi Beograd, Novi Sad, Sombor, Pristina, Nis (Nis is 
the administrative center of an area populated with ethnic Bulgarians, and located close 
to the Bulgarian border - D.R.), Kragujevac, Baric, and Bar." 
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The ecologic damages include potentially hazardous pollution from depleted 
uranium weapons, which will have as-yet-unknown impact on drinking water, and hence 
the food chain of the entire region. 
“In Bulgaria, water sampling of toxic metals and metalloids in the sediments 
near the border between May 25‘h and May 2gth exceeded average longstanding 
levels by three times for lead, 1,400 times for copper, and 30 times for cadmium.” 
NATO bombing of power stations and transformers released the highly dangerous 
pollutant, PCB Pyralene. PCBs are known carcinogens, causing skin and liver cancers as 
well as damage to the reproductive organs. PCB poisoning can be passed from mother to 
child via breast-feeding. There is no safe level of exposure in the opinion of many 
scientists, and a single liter of PCB pollutes as much as a billion liters of water. The 
quantity of PCBs released into water and air is not known because even in sites where 
Pyralene use had been discontinued, PCB waste was often stored in drums rather than 
destroyed or neutralized. 
The REC warns that: “Dramatic pollution of most rivers in Yugoslavia by heavy 
metals, pyralene (PCB), oil etc., will almost certainly affect the neighboring 
‘downstream’ countries of Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine in the coming days, months 
or years.” 
While high concentrations of toxins in the air were an acute (short-term) result, 
the contamination of water and soil presents a long-term health risk. The REC 
conclusion asserts: “All released substances will undoubtedly become part of the hture 
biochemical cycles-possibly with unpredictable transformations, which enlarge fbture 
risks.” 
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On May 27th Reuters reported that: Romania blames acid rain on NATO bombing. 
"NATO's two-month-old bombing campaign against Yugoslavia has caused acid rains in 
Romania and its authorities are concerned over the possible long-term impact of pollution 
on the Danube and the Black Sea." Acid rains in May in areas on the Yugoslav border 
were "the direct consequence of air pollution caused by fires following bombings" 
against targets in Yugoslavia, the Ministry of Environment pointed out in a report. Local 
officials report higher concentrations of heavy metals in the Danube - which forms 
Romania's southern border with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over 1,075 km (670 miles), 
then forks into a delta before flowing into the Black Sea. A ministerial study of the 
Danube water pollution showed that copper, lead, chromium and cadmium concentrations 
during three days in a row in April were twice as much as the permissible levels. The 
study also showed zinc concentrations between 20 and 55 times more than the 
permissible levels during that same period? 
These facts show clearly that the ecologic damages in Yugoslavia also 
affect Bulgaria to a certain degree. Undoubtedly they will have a certain hidden long- 
term economic impact, especially on such sensitive branches as agriculture and 
tourism, which play a substantial role in the Bulgarian economy. What would be the 
most likely importance of this impact, how would the concrete figures look like is not 
impossible but too hard to be estimated. 
httv:i!~ww.tinerherbs.comleclecticaiearthcrash/ne.ws!' 1 999/05/27-5 .html 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In spite of the initial highly negative and catastrophic expectations of the Bulgarian 
public, the country gains after the recent war turned out to be probably much more than the 
losses the country suffered. Bulgaria gained political dividends, which for the first time 
during its post-communist history seemed to be not only a virtual and humiliating tapping but 
also real dividends transferable in significant immediate and long-term economic gains. The 
prospects of the country for EU and NATO membership now seem to be much more realistic 
than ever in the past, because of the new attitude of the West towards Bulgaria. 
Nevertheless, the unpleasant truth is that internally (economically, socially, legislatively, and 
politically) the country is not still ready to meet the requirements of these organizations. 
Although the consequences look like a “happy-end,” it would be honest to confess 
that the war in Kosovo posed serious economic, political, ethnic and military risks to 
Bulgaria and brought serious ecological negative effects. Most of the immediate direct risks 
fortunately have fortunately already gone, there is a series of long-term risks that threaten the 
Bulgarian and the Balkans’ future. 
NATO intervention and the postwar settlements have not solved the ethnic, political 
and economic problems on the Balkans, but complicated them and created new ones. After 
the KOSOVO’S precedent, the possibility of future ethnic and national clashes now seems to be 
greater, and the risks for Bulgaria seem higher. Macedonia might be “the next in the Balkan 
domino.” Many of the mentioned problems (including economic progress and social 
stability) have to be solved to some degree by the Balkan Stability Pact. Unfortunately, up to 
now both eh Stability Pact as well as the documents of its commissions is much more filled 
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with good wishes and empty formulae than with real effective measures for economic 
recovery, social and political transition. 
Now, Yugoslavia remains isolated, with a destroyed infrastructure and economy. It is 
like a “black hole” at the Bulgarian border on the road connecting the country with Europe. 
With the infrastructure projects that are among the major priorities of the European financial 
program for the Balkans and more particularly the transport corridors number 8 and 4 (only 
partially financed by the EU) the EU is trying to avoid destructed Serbia and to isolate it 
from the world, easing to some degree the burden of the damages that the war caused to 
countries like Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia. An approach like that condemning a whole 
nation to isolation, destruction and humiliation, turning it into hostage of one person 
(Milosevic), could not be a basis for real stability, for long lasting peace and security on the 
Balkans, as it turns into a permanent source of economic, social, ethnic and political tension. 
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